

STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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THE UNITED STATES MILITARY AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION OPERATIONS

BY

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and
Humanitarian Intervention Operations

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ABSTRACT

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Humanitarian intervention has been and will probably continue to be a common mission for U.S. forces. International law under the United Nations Charter provides for humanitarian intervention, which can be justified ethically and morally. Our current national policy on humanitarian intervention is consistent and provides linkage between the ends, ways and means. However, our national policy does not adequately address the long-term impact of using military resources on humanitarian intervention missions that do not support either our vital or our important national interest.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	1
Sovereignty versus Human Rights	3
Current US Policy	9
Impact of the Media	17
Risks Associated with Current Policy	19
Conclusions	22
Endnotes	25
Bibliography	29

United States Military
and
Humanitarian Intervention Operations

Humanitarian intervention has come to mean "military intervention in another country, with limited or no agreement with the authorities there, to prevent widespread suffering and death among the population."¹ It is the action of other countries who come to the aid of "victims either deliberately harmed by evil governments, forced to flee their homes and go into exile or suffering from natural or man-made disasters with which their governments are incapable of coping."²

The United States has used its military to intervene in the affairs of other countries, for various reasons, throughout its history. "The United States has traditionally justified its military interventions by appealing to two priorities: national security and national interests. In the post-Cold War world, the United States is increasingly confronted with military intervention scenarios that serve a new and different priority--protecting the values of the United States."³

Recently, U.S. forces have participated in humanitarian intervention operations in Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda and in northern Iraq on behalf of the Kurds. As this paper is written, we have

more than a U.S. Army Division, out of an Army of only ten divisions, in Bosnia on a humanitarian intervention mission.

Humanitarian intervention has been, and will probably continue to be, a common mission for U.S. forces. It is important that we understand the issues and our national policy concerning humanitarian intervention. This is especially true since "we now face a large number of failed states like Somalia or Liberia; or troubled states, like Sudan, Sri Lanka or Rwanda; and murderous states like Iraq or Haiti under the military regime of 1991-1994."⁴

This paper will first examine the potential conflict between national sovereignty and human rights. The analysis will show that international law under the United Nations Charter provides for humanitarian intervention, and that it is justified ethically and morally. It will then examine the current U.S. policy on the use of its military in humanitarian intervention. The analysis will also show that our current national policy is consistent and provides linkage between the ends (objectives), ways (concepts), and means (resources). However, our national policy does not adequately address the long-term impact of using military resources on humanitarian intervention missions that do not support either our vital or our important national interests.

Sovereignty versus Human Rights

"Humanitarian intervention, that is intervention in another state to protect human rights, is one of the more controversial issues in international law. The world community is reluctant to intervene or condone intervention in the so-called affairs of individual states."⁵ One of the reasons for this reluctance is that intervention, by definition, violates the sovereignty of the state where the intervention takes place.

The concept of sovereignty or that of a sovereign nation has been attributed to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and has since been one of the basic precepts of international law. The principle of sovereignty gave the ruler autonomy over his state and the people in his state as long as his actions did not negatively affect other nations--and violate their sovereignty.⁶

"Noninterventionists condemn humanitarian intervention because it allegedly violates the noninterventionist principles of the Charter of the United Nations and because it is a doctrine that is open to abuse by larger states."⁷ It is easy to understand why many would disagree with intervention--for humanitarian or other reasons, as intervention runs counter to the long held concept of sovereignty. The argument comes down to which concept, that of sovereignty or human rights, has primacy.

This paper will show that humanitarian intervention is supported by the Charter of the United Nations. It will argue that humanitarian intervention is ethically justified when there are gross violations of human rights or massive suffering.

One of the arguments against humanitarian intervention is that international law, which provides predictability and consistency and thus stability to the world, does not provide a legal basis for intervention in another nation's affairs. We could examine many legal sources to answer the question of whether or not humanitarian intervention has support in international law. However, we need look no further than the United Nations Charter that discusses both sovereignty and the actions allowed--and required of its members to protect human rights. The Charter provides support for both sides of this controversial issue. This apparent contradiction may well have been intentional, to allow the United Nations member states to judge each situation according to its merits--and eventually to support either position.

With the first read, it would appear that the Charter of the United Nations assures the sovereignty of its members. Article 2 Section 1 states, "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members." Section 4 of Article

2 goes on to say, "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." Section 7 of Article 2 also supports sovereignty by stating, "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." However, Section 7 of Article 2 also provides for humanitarian intervention by continuing, "but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."⁸ Chapter VII provides for, "ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION."

It is important to recognize that in its preamble, the Charter of the United Nations does not emphasize sovereignty or states rights but instead human rights, dignity, equal rights and justice. The preamble states:

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental **human rights**, in the **dignity and worth of the human person**, in the **equal rights of men and women** and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which **justice** and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in general. (Emphasis added)

Article 1 of the Charter states that one of "The Purposes of the United Nations" is "to achieve international co-operation in

solving humanitarian problems and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights."⁹ In addition, Article 55, in Chapter VII, provides for the protection of human rights in the following language: "the United Nations shall promote...universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all." Chapter VII, Article 56 binds the United Nations' members to action for the protection of human rights by stating, "All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55."

A more thorough examination of the Charter of the United Nations reveals that it not only provides for, but requires, action to protect human rights, human dignity and justice.

Stanley Hoffman says it well in the following quote:

refusing to intervene because such interventions violate the sovereignty of states is morally indefensible, for the rights are not holy and depend in the final analysis upon the state's ability and will to uphold the rights of its people. The moral case for sovereignty, which is often strong--that sovereignty protects the people from alien domination and intrusion--breaks down in the instances in which humanitarian tragedies and abominations occur.¹⁰

As articulated by Stanley Hoffman, one reluctance to accept humanitarian intervention, as legal and ethical, is the concern that countries, using the pretext of humanitarian intervention, could act unilaterally causing clashes and wars. The fear is

that a stronger intervening country could dominate a weaker one in pursuit of their own national interests.¹¹ This is certainly possible, whether or not the concept of humanitarian intervention is accepted as legal and ethical. Just one of the many examples of improper intervention, in the name of humanitarian assistance, is when Belgium intervened in the affairs of the Congo, a former colony, in 1960.

States currently act unilaterally or in coalition to intervene in another country's affairs for a variety of reasons. However, improper intervention is less likely if we can agree on the criteria for humanitarian intervention and the criteria includes sanctioning by the United Nations.

In his article "The Lawfulness of Humanitarian Intervention," Felix Lopez provides us with an excellent and comprehensive proposal for the test of the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention.

- There can be no lawful intervention unless there exists a gross violation of human rights.
- Interventions to remedy gross violations of human rights should be carried out by the United Nations or a group of nations acting under the authority of the United Nations.
- Interventions should bear the imprimatur of the international community.
- The victims of the alleged abuse welcome or would welcome the intervention.
- Except in case of dire need and distress, an intervener must first employ the gamut of noncoercive strategies to help put an end to the offending policies.
- The intervener must demonstrate necessity and further must ensure that the force is used in proportion to the objective.

- An intervention cannot be intended solely for the purpose of infringing on the territorial integrity or political independence of the human rights violator.
- An intervention should be of limited duration.
- The net effects of the intervention must be positive for the community of victims and for the larger community.¹²

Despite the possibility of abuse, in most cases it is better to risk improper intervention by a stronger state than to allow gross violations of human rights to go unchecked by refusing to acknowledge the appropriateness of humanitarian intervention.

"To claim that intervention is lawful, at least for the purpose of remedying gross violations of human rights, is not the same as suggesting that states be given broad license to intervene in the affairs of other states; it is only to argue that it is not in the common interest for either the world community or individual states to sit still in the face of gross violations of human rights."¹³

The conclusion is clear. The United States and the world not only have legal standing, but a moral duty to intervene when massive violations of human rights or human suffering are involved.

The international community has a moral and ethical obligation to intervene under certain circumstances. The United Nations represents the legal authority for intervention. So the violation of human rights is one limit on absolute sovereignty.

General Bernard E. Trainer¹⁴

Current US Policy

To determine the current U.S. policy on the use of military forces in humanitarian intervention, this paper will examine: President William J. Clinton's A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (NSS 96); the Annual Report to the President and the Congress, prepared under the former Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili's National Military Strategy (NMS 95).

Former U.S. Senator William S. Cohen was confirmed by the Senate as secretary of defense on January 22, 1997. Of course, he has not had an opportunity to publish his defense strategy or policy guidance, as secretary of defense. However, remarks during his confirmation hearings give us some insight on his thoughts concerning these issues. One of the points he made during the hearings was that, "he was predisposed to be cautious in recommending the use of military forces abroad."¹⁵

In these national strategy documents, humanitarian intervention is a term not frequently used and there is no U.S. policy that directly addresses humanitarian intervention. Because of this, it is important to examine these national policy documents for their humanitarian intervention component concepts.

The primary component concepts in these documents are humanitarian assistance and military intervention. Other related concepts include: foreign disaster relief, peacemaking, and expanded peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

To illustrate the way the national strategy documents discuss humanitarian intervention missions, we will look at the way each of them labels the recent, relatively successful humanitarian mission in Rwanda. In the NSS 96, President Clinton refers to it as a "relief operation," former Secretary of Defense, Perry, calls it "humanitarian intervention," and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs refers to it as an "assistance operation" in the NMS 95.¹⁶

In NSS 96, President Clinton defines the "central goals" of his national security strategy as:

- To enhance our security with military forces that are ready to fight and with effective representation abroad.
- To bolster America's economic revitalization.
- To promote democracy abroad.¹⁷

In his annual report, former Secretary Perry, defines "the principal components" of the U.S. strategy as "enhancing security, promoting prosperity and promoting democracy."¹⁸ In NMS 95, General Shalikashvili states the national military objectives are "promoting stability and thwarting aggression."¹⁹

Military participation abroad in humanitarian interventions demonstrates our ability to project our armed forces--which shows our capability to project our military power. At the same time the military provides the forces necessary to end the oppressive situation and provide security for humanitarian assistance. The positive, professional image that our armed forces project in the effective execution of these military operations enhances our national security, promotes democracy, promotes stability and thwarts aggression. Concurrently, these missions save lives and put an end to human suffering, which provides stability and promotes democracy through the demonstration of a democratic country's interests and values. Thus, humanitarian interventions support the "central goals" of the President's national security strategy, the "principal components" of the former Secretary of Defense's strategy and the national military objectives of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff.

National Security Strategy 96 states that we will only send the U.S. troops abroad "when our interests and our values are sufficiently at stake."²⁰ It states that,

The decision on *whether* and *when* to use force is therefore dictated first and foremost by our national interest. In those specific areas where our vital or survival interests are at stake, our use of force will be decisive and, if necessary unilateral. In other situations posing a less immediate threat, our military engagement must be targeted selectively on those areas that most affect our national interests.²¹

National Security Strategy 96 then discusses three types of interests--"vital interests," "important, but not vital, interests;" and "humanitarian interests." The NSS 96 defines vital interests as, "interests that are of broad, overriding importance to the survival, security, and vitality of our national entity--the defense of the U.S. territory, citizens, allies and our economic well-being." Important, but not vital interests are defined in the NSS as interests that, "do not affect our national survival, but they do affect our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live." National Security Strategy 96 does not define humanitarian interests. However, humanitarian intervention supports American values, and as such, our national interests.

By using humanitarian interests as a criteria for intervention, President Clinton has retained flexibility for determining which operations the United States will support, In 1993, President Bush said, "we cannot always decide in advance which interests will require our using military force to protect them."²² The President's NSS 96, is consistent with former President Bush's position when it states, "it is unwise to specify in advance all the limitations we will place on our use of force."²³ The criterion is vague enough to include or

preclude a broad spectrum of situations including those involving widespread suffering and death.

Former Secretary of Defense, William Perry, states what the President's strategy alludes to, or at least leaves open--that "in some instances, the United States may act out of humanitarian concern, even in the absence of a direct threat to U.S. national interests."²⁴ While commenting on the use of military forces abroad during his confirmation hearings, Secretary Cohen said, "there were cases in which such deployments might be justified even though vital U.S. interests were not immediately jeopardized."²⁵ National Military Strategy 95 supports both the NSS 96 and the Secretary of Defense's position by stating, "Our Armed Forces stand ready to participate in humanitarian and disaster relief operations at home and abroad."²⁶

Former Defense Secretary Perry's Criteria for the use of the U.S. military in any intervention includes:

After considering the interests at stake and the costs of the operation, the administration will consider many factors before deciding whether to commit forces, what objectives to assign them, and what level of forces to employ. Prominent among these factors are:

- Existing treaty commitments.
- The willingness and ability of like-minded nations, particularly those most directly affected by the conflict, to contribute to the operation.
- Whether, in the absence of coalition partners, U.S. multilateral action is justified.
- Clear military objectives supporting political objectives.

- Judgements about the necessary duration and costs of the operation. In other words, can it be achieved in a reasonable amount of time with an acceptable expenditure of resources and concluded in an acceptable manner.
 - The willingness to commit sufficient forces to achieve the defined objective.
 - The extent to which support for U.S. involvement exists among Congress and the American people, and the extent to which such support can be marshaled.
 - The acceptability, in the case of multilateral operations, of proposed arrangements for command and control of U.S. forces.
- The relationship among the size, composition, and disposition of forces committed and U.S. objectives must be continually reassessed and, if necessary, adjusted.²⁷

The President's "guidelines" "on how we use force" state that "when we send American troops abroad, we will send them with a clear mission and, for those operations that are likely to involve combat, the means to achieve their objectives decisively."²⁸ Taking issue with the Clinton administration's policy concerning Bosnia during his confirmation hearings, Secretary Cohen stated, "an arbitrary deadline was not an adequate substitute for an 'exit strategy'--a plan detailing how U.S. forces would disengage from a risky deployment."²⁹

In his article "Clinton's Vision Problem," Gregory Foster asks, "Will we stress the flexible burden-bearing of unilateralism or the frustrating burden-sharing of multilateralism?"³⁰ In May of 1994, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, provided the "factors" that the

Administration would use to recommend to the President that U.S. personnel participate in UN and other peace operations:

- Participation advances U.S. interests and both the unique and general risks to American personnel have been weighed and are considered acceptable.
- Personnel, funds and other resources are available;
- U.S. participation is necessary for the operation's success;
- The role of U.S. forces is tied to clear objectives and an endpoint for U.S. participation can be identified;
- Domestic and Congressional support exists or can be marshaled;
- Command and control arrangements are acceptable.

Additionally, even more rigorous factors will be applied when there is the possibility of significant U.S. participation in Chapter VII operations that are likely to involve combat:

- There exists a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives;
- There exists a plan to achieve those objectives decisively;
- There exists a commitment to reassess and adjust, as necessary, the size, composition and disposition of our forces to achieve our objectives³¹

However, in NSS 96, the President provides his own answer to Foster's question. His position on how (emphasis is in original document) we use U.S. forces is:

as much as possible, we will seek the help of our allies and friends or of relevant international institutions. If our most important national interests are at stake, we are willing to act alone. But especially on those matters touching directly the interests of our allies, there should be a proportional commitment from them. Working together increases the effectiveness of each nation's actions, and sharing the responsibilities lessens everyone's load.³²

Clearly, the military is the only national agency that is expeditionary, and the only national resource that has the capability to conduct forced intervention for humanitarian

operations. However, as NSS 96 appropriately points out, the military is "generally" not "the best tool to address humanitarian concerns."³³ The former Secretary of Defense agrees by stating, "agencies and programs other than the U.S. armed forces are generally the best tools for addressing humanitarian crises."³⁴

The President and the former Secretary of Defense use the same language to describe the situation that would make the use of military forces appropriate for participation in a humanitarian operation.

- A humanitarian crises dwarfs the ability of civilian agencies to respond.
- The need for relief is urgent, and only the military can jump-start a response.
- The response requires resources unique to the military.
- The risk to American service members is minimal.³⁵

During his confirmation hearings Defense Secretary Cohen said that, "there were circumstances under which it was appropriate to use U.S. forces to alleviate humanitarian crises overseas if, for instance, lives were threatened on so large a scale that civilian agencies could not cope."³⁶

In NSS 96, the President says that, "U.S. military forces and assets are frequently called upon to provide assistance to victims of floods, storms, drought and other human disasters.

Both at home and abroad, U.S. forces provide emergency food, shelter, medical care and security to those in need."³⁷

The Secretary of Defense states that for the "humanitarian intervention" in Rwanda "only the U.S. military had the ability to rapidly initiate the humanitarian effort to bring clean water, food, and medicine to Hutu refugees who had fled from Rwanda in the wake of a catastrophic tribal conflict."³⁸ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff states that the U.S. military has "unique capabilities in terms of logistics (transport, supply, and distribution), communications and security." He goes on to say the military's "greatest contribution" is often its ability to respond rapidly when the "traditional relief agencies are overwhelmed."³⁹ Using organic resources and having well defined and existing command and control is a tremendous advantage for the military.

Impact of the Media

One of the troubling aspects of humanitarian intervention is the way the United States and the world chooses which situations merit remedy through intervention. "Value interventions raise difficult questions about why the United States intervened in one situation but not another."⁴⁰ We intervened in Somalia; but not

in the Sudan. We intervened in Sarajevo; but not in Mozambique or Angola.⁴¹ Recent U.S. humanitarian intervention operations followed an outpouring of public sympathy over the plight of the victims.

The element that raised the consciousness and emotions of the American public to call for the use of military to intervene and remedy the situation, with the corresponding risks, was not the country's leadership--it was television. "The news media exerts a powerful influence on US and world opinion by deciding which crises to publicize and which to ignore. Real-time pictures of starving Somali children, for example, helped spur decisions to intervene, while famine in inaccessible Sudan still receives scant notice."⁴² Television, at least where death and human suffering is concerned, helps mobilize and solidify public opinion, helps define national interests and will, and plays a large roll in national policy. "The CNN factor greatly influences value interventions. Television has a much more significant impact on the decision to intervene in value cases than in interest or security cases."⁴³

Risks Associated with Current Policy

The risks to the United States of humanitarian intervention include those inherent to any hostile action. These include the possibility of death of military personnel and loss of national will and international prestige and influence due to an unsuccessful or failed operation--or a U.S. pull-out when the loss of life becomes too high.

Another indirect risk is that the nation's military will not be prepared to fight and win our nation's wars, due to the diversion of resources to humanitarian interventions. Patricia Irvin, deputy assistant secretary of defense for humanitarian and refugee affairs, shows that she is aware of this possibility when she says, "I do agree that we must be vigilant that our military's primary mission is not harmed by its involvement in humanitarian operations." In the same speech Ms. Irvin addresses the impact of funding humanitarian operations out of the Department of Defense budget, as she says:

These represent large, unbudgeted expenses for the Defense Department. Unless a way is developed to pay for them, the result could be reductions in training, force structure, modernization and quality of life for our troops--all of which could translate into reduced readiness.⁴⁴

Future readiness is just as important as current readiness--and may prove to be more important, if a near peer belligerent emerges in the future, as many strategists predict. "Repeated

operations not directly related to U.S. security, though of value, may expend so much of our operations and maintenance (O&M) funds that little is left to invest in future readiness."⁴⁵ In an article concerning the Army's 1998 budget and its "blow to modernization," George Seffers quotes a senior Army budget official as he writes:

"We have no contingency dollars in this budget," the senior Army budget official said. "That means [for] the Bosnias and some of the other requirements that we have in deploying our force, the dollars are not there."⁴⁶

Unfortunately, no one knows exactly how many military resources the U.S. can commit to humanitarian intervention or other operations that do not address either our vital or our important interests before the force will not be prepared to fight the next war. However, we do know that the force is deployed more often and involved in more missions now than it was, with its then more robust size, prior to the end of the cold war. According to Lieutenant General Jay Garner, the Assistant Vice of Chief of Staff of the Army, the U.S. Army had 10 operational events in the 31 years from 1960-1991 and 26 in the six years since 1991.⁴⁷

We also know that it takes time to properly prepare, train for, and recover from a humanitarian intervention mission-- just as it does for a more "conventional" mission.

There is a three-to-one ratio involved in doing a peacekeeping job. You need to train one set of troops to be peacekeepers, have them serve as peacekeepers, and then retrain them to be soldiers. You must rotate three times the number of soldiers required to actually perform the peacekeeping function because of the need to train and retrain them for the challenges of a peacekeeping mission.

Former Secretary of Defense and Congressman, Les Aspin⁴⁸

Many of the country's military and civilian leaders that have addressed the Army War College Class of 1997 have expressed fears that the United States' military forces have already been cut too low to support our nations two major regional conflicts (MRC) strategy. The Army's leaders that have spoken to the War College are especially concerned about the ability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous MRCs. Diverting forces from readiness and training to prepare for humanitarian intervention missions only exacerbates the problem.

On February 11, 1997, Steve Kosiak, Director of Budget Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments said this about the Army--as he compared the Army's budget for research development and procurement with the other services:

I think it [the Army] takes the two major regional conflict requirement more seriously. If you take it seriously, you need to maintain the force structure and can't pay for the more modern equipment.⁴⁹

The Army's 1988 research, development and acquisition (RDA) budget is about one-third of the amount it was ten years ago. We cannot continue to divert RDA funds to pay for operations other than war, without negatively impacting the future readiness of our armed forces.

During his confirmation hearings, Secretary Cohen stated, "U.S. troops should be committed to situations in which vital national interests were not threatened only if a careful analysis concluded that the benefits to the United States would exceed the costs."⁵⁰ This analysis should include all the operations in which the U.S. military is involved and the costs should include the long term effects of using a finite and shrinking amount of defense funds for humanitarian assistance.

Conclusions

International law provides a legal basis for humanitarian intervention, to stop massive human death and suffering. We have a national security strategy and a national military strategy that supports humanitarian intervention when it is in our national interest. In addition to vital and important, our national security strategy now provides for humanitarian

interests. Our national security strategy and our national military strategy provide the ends, the ways and the U.S. military provides the force to support our humanitarian interests--when humanitarian intervention is required.

It is difficult to not support humanitarian intervention from a national values perspective. The national security strategy is right on target in keeping our national interests, which embody our national values, as the criteria for humanitarian intervention.

There are those that argue that humanitarian interventions are worth the risks and expenditure of national resources because these operations lessen or eliminate the likelihood of war by making the world more stable. This view is not realistic. The value of the humanitarian need, and our ability to meet it, should be weighed against both the short and long term costs to our vital and important interests.

Military intervention operations, no matter how innocuously they begin, may eventually make US soldiers, Marines, sailors, and airmen lay their lives on the line. The President, Congress, and their advisers therefore would be wise to repeatedly scrutinize pertinent national interests, threats, objectives, policies, plans, resources, public opinion, and priorities before and after military intervention begins to ascertain whether corrective actions are required.⁵¹

The record of long-term stability following U.S. humanitarian interventions has not been good. Unfortunately,

instability followed by human pain, and suffering usually return to these countries and regions. Without political and economic reforms that address the cause of the original instability, there will not be long-term success.

It is not prudent to divert military resources to the extent the country's warfighting readiness, and our national security is negatively impacted. Readiness, both current and future has already be negatively impacted by a combination of "downsizing" and increased missions--most of which are not based on vital or important national interests. As President Bush said,

No, the United States should not seek to be the world's policeman. There is no support abroad or at home for us to play this role, nor should there be. We would exhaust ourselves in the process, wasting precious resources needed to address those problems at home and abroad that we cannot afford to ignore.⁵²

Endnotes

¹ Roberts, Adam. "Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights." International Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 3. July 1993, 445.

² Hoffman, Stanley. "Out of the Cold: Humanitarian Intervention in the 1990s." Harvard International Review, Vol. XVI, No. 1. Fall 1993, 9.

³ Aspin, Les. Challenges to Value-Based Military Intervention, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, February 1995, v.

Keynote address from the Managing Chaos Conference.

⁴ Hoffman, Stanley. "The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention." Survival, Vol. 37, No 4. Winter 1995-96, 31.

⁵ Lopez, Felix. "The Lawfulness of Humanitarian Intervention." USAFA Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 2, 1994, 97.

⁶ Trainer, Bernard E. "A Doctrine For Limited Tears." Military Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention and Military-Media Relations. University of California, Berkeley, 1995, 1-2.

⁷ Lopez, 97.

⁸ Article 2, Sections 1, 4 and 7 of the Charter of the United Nations
The Organization and its members, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
4. All members shall refrain in their international relations the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

⁹ Charter of the United Nations, Article 1:

The Purposes of the United Nations are:...3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all...(emphasis added)

¹⁰ Hoffman Stanley. "Out of the Cold: Humanitarian Intervention in the 1990s." 62.

¹¹ Lopez, 97 and Roberts, Adam. "The Road to Hell...A Critique of Humanitarian Intervention." Harvard International Review, Vol. XVI, No. 1, Fall 1993, 11.

¹² Lopez, 105-107.

¹³ Lopez, 105.

¹⁴ Trainer, 3.

¹⁵ Towell, Pat. "Cohen, in Confirmation Hearing, Vows Timely Bosnia Pullout." Congressional Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 4, January 25, 1997, 247.

¹⁶ Clinton, William J. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. Washington: White House, February 1996, 18.

Perry, William J. Annual Report to the President and Congress. Washington, March 1996, xi.

Shalikashvili, John M. National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1995. Washington, 1995, 9.

¹⁷ Clinton, i.

¹⁸ Perry, 2.

The three principal components of the U.S. strategy of engagement and enlargement are:

- *Enhancing security. The United States must maintain a strong defense capability and promote cooperative security measures.*
- *Promoting prosperity. The United States will work with other countries to create a more open and equitable international trading system and spur economic growth.*
- *Promoting Democracy. The United States will work to protect, consolidate, and enlarge the community of free democracies around the globe.*¹⁸

¹⁹ Shalikashvili, i.

²⁰ Clinton, iii.

²¹ Clinton, 18.

²² Bush, George, "The Use of Military Force: The President's Difficult Choice." Readings: Volume V, Course 2: "War, National Policy & Strategy," Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, Academic Year 1997, 28.

Address by President George Bush to the Corps of Cadets, US Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., Jan. 5, 1993.

²³ Clinton, 18.

²⁴ Perry, xi.

²⁵ Towell, 247.

²⁶ Shalikashvili, 9.

²⁷ Strategic Assessment 1996, Instruments of U.S. Power, National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, 159.

²⁸ Clinton, 19.

²⁹ Towell, 247.

³⁰ Foster, Gregory D. "Clinton's Vision Problem." Readings: Volume V, Course 2: "War, National Policy & Strategy" Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, Academic Year 1997, 3.

³¹ The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, Washington D.C., Office of the President, May 1994, "Executive Summary." Public Domain.

³² Clinton, 19.

³³ Clinton, 18.

³⁴ Perry, xi.

³⁵ Clinton, 18; Perry, xi.

³⁶ Towell, 247.

³⁷ Clinton, 17.

³⁸ Perry, xi.

³⁹ Shalikashvili, 9.

⁴⁰ Aspin, v.

⁴¹ Trainer, 4.

⁴² Collins, John M. "Military Intervention: A Checklist of Key Considerations." Parameters, Vol. XXV, No. 4, Winter 1995-96, 58.

⁴³ Aspin, v.

⁴⁴ Irvin, Patricia L. "Strategy for Humanitarian Interventions." Defense Issues, Vol. 9, No. 83, 1994, 3.

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- ⁴⁵ Collins, 57.
- ⁴⁶ Seffers, George I. "Army Budget Deals Blow to Modernization." *Defense News*, February 17-23, 1997, 20.
- ⁴⁷ Naylor, Sean D. "Creeping Hollowness." *Army Times*, February 3, 1997, 14.
- ⁴⁸ Aspin, v.
- ⁴⁹ Seffers, 20.
- ⁵⁰ Towell, 247.
- ⁵¹ Collins, 58.
- ⁵² Bush, 27.

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